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Abstract. Abandoning the oft-presumed common prior assumption, partitioned type spaces 
with disparate priors are studied. It is shown that in the two-player case, a unique 
fundamental pair of priors ),( 21 pp  can be identified in each type space, from whose 
properties boundaries on the possible ranges of expected values under common knowledge 
can be derived. In the limit as 1p  and 2p  approach each other, 21 ppp ==  is a common 
prior, and standard results stemming from the common prior assumption are recapitulated. 
It is further shown that this two-player fundamental pair of priors is a special case of the n-
player situation, where a representative n-tuple of fundamentally associated priors 
),...,( 10 −npp  can be selected, out of at most 1−n  such n-tuples, to play an analogous role. 
JEL Classification Numbers: C70, D82, D84. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
1.1 The Common Prior Assumption 
 
The common prior assumption (CPA) is, in a sense, one (mathematically rigorous) 
answer to the age-old philosophical question ‘how can reasonable and honest individuals 
come to disagree?’ The CPA, as widely adopted in much of economics, game theory and 
decision theory literature, responds to this question via what has come to be called ‘the 
Harsányi Doctrine’, namely the position that all women and men are ‘created equal’ with 
respect to probability assessments in the absence of information – hence the term 
common prior – and all differences in probabilities should therefore, in principle, be 
traced to asymmetries in information received over time. 
 
It is difficult to over-state the pervasiveness of the common prior assumption. It suffices 
in this regard to quote the words of Aumann (1987), which still hold true despite the 
years that have passed since they were written:  
 
‘Common priors are explicit or implicit in the vast majority of the differential 
information literature in economics and game theory… The assumption is 
pervasive in the enormous literature on rational expectations, trading in 
securities, bargaining under incomplete information, auctions, repeated games, 
signalling, discrimination, insurance, principal-agent, moral hazard, search, 
entry and exit, bankruptcy, what have you. Citing the relevant papers would 
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make our references longer than our text. Occasionally the definitions do pay 
lip-service to the possibility of distinct priors ip ; but usually this is quickly 
abandoned, and in the theorems and examples, one returns to common priors’.  
 
The CPA is also a crucial assumption under-pinning the celebrated ‘agreeing to 
disagree’2 paper of Aumann (1976), which proves a surprising theorem showing that it is 
impossible for private information to lead to divergent beliefs under conditions of 
common knowledge. Numerous authors have since extended this result and applied it to 
interactions between agents in various situations. The typical result is a ‘no-bet’ or ‘no-
trade’ theorem (cf. Milgrom and Stokey (1982), Sebenius and Geanakopolos (1983)) – 
agents who start with common prior distributions will never agree to engage in 
speculative trade based on differences in private information that they subsequently 
receive. As soon as it becomes common knowledge that they wish to trade, their 
expectations for the value of assets in question become identical. 
 
As Nau (1995) points out ‘these results are perceived to be a problem for the theory of 
speculative markets: asymmetric information alone cannot be responsible for the 
existence of large stock exchanges… It is a point which is crucial for the understanding 
of the very complex speculative markets we see nowadays’.   
 
The disconnect between no bet/no trade theoretical models and empirical reality may be 
due to several factors, among them risk-aversion issues, bounded rationality, lack of 
common knowledge, the cost of information exchange, and errors in information 
transmission and/or reception. In this paper, however, attention will be focussed solely on 
the common prior assumption.  
 
The CPA may, and has, been challenged (cf. Gul (1998) and Nau (1995) for only two of 
many examples) for being an assumption that is far too strong to be believed to apply in 
reality as much as one might suspect given how often it is assumed in models in the 
literature. The CPA is often accompanied by a story that postulates that the current 
probabilistic beliefs of players all stem from temporal Bayesian updating conducted 
under conditions of asymmetric information – a story that may be fictional and/or 
irrelevant to the model being studied. Furthermore, it supposes that if one goes back 
sufficiently far in this historical story, there was a point in time when all the players were 
in possession of the same information and were in full agreement on a prior probability 
distribution. Philosophically, one may object there never was a primeval moment in time 
when all individuals were in exactly the same state of information – everyone receives 
different sensory data and filters it through his or her own cognitive model of the physical 
and social environment from the moment of birth.  
 
Partly in response to this chorus of objections, efforts were conducted in the 1990s to 
seek out a full characterisation of when the CPA may and may not hold in a model. These 
efforts were crowned with success, resulting in at least two different characterisations. 
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Independently, Morris (1995), Samet (1998b) and Feinberg (2000), proved one 
characterisation, in which the presence or absence of a common prior depends on the 
absence or presence of at least one bet which seems, from each player’s private 
perspective, to guarantee him or her positive expected value. In addition to this, Samet 
(1998a) defined and proved a characterisation based on the convergence of ‘infinite 
iterated expectations’. Both of these characterisations will play major roles in this paper. 
 
Since then, however, there has been very little written on the next obvious question: 
given an apparent need for the systematic study of models that do not presume common 
priors, and the existence to hand of full characterisations of the common prior situation, 
what non-trivial results can be attained in models in which the common prior assumption 
is removed as an axiom, and instead disparate priors
3
 are taken into account? This paper 
represents an attempt to begin answering this question.   
 
We are especially inspired by Morris (1995) (and Bernheim (1986) before him) in 
seeking to illustrate that it is not the case, despite what is sometimes claimed, that 
‘anything can happen’ if the common prior assumption is relaxed. To the contrary, we 
strive here to show that even with disparate priors it is possible to derive interesting 
bounding theorems under conditions of common knowledge, and indeed to place 
common priors inside a broader context, so that – in line with a ‘correspondence 
principle’ – the standard results stemming from the common prior assumption re-emerge 
in the limit as disparate priors approach common priors.  
 
An important debt is also acknowledged to Samet (1998a) and Nehring (2001), for 
theorems appealed to, methods of proofs, and ideas and inspiration in general. 
 
1.2 Summary of Results 
 
The formal treatment of the beliefs of players is usually conducted by representing those 
beliefs by use of a partitioned type space. In this model, players are assumed not to know 
everything about the world, and instead to consider a set of possible states, only one of 
which is the true state. The players are not perfectly informed, and are unsure which is 
the true state. Each player’s knowledge is represented by an information partition, which 
divides the states into a number of mutually disjoint and exhaustive subsets. If two states 
are in the same partition, the player cannot tell them apart; instead, the player has a 
probability distribution on each partition, giving the likelihood of which state in the 
partition is the true state, under the assumption that the true state is located somewhere 
within that partition.  
 
It is convenient to summarise player i’s knowledge by way of a ‘type matrix’ iM  from 
which the player’s partitions and probability distribution can easily be read. These 
matrices also have the desirable properties that player i’s expectation of a random 
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variable f is simply given by fM i , and a prior probability distribution for player i by 
iii pMp = . Such a distribution is called a common prior if a single p satisfies 
ppM i = simultaneously for all players.   
 
The Morris-Feinberg characterisation of common priors (Morris (1995), Feinberg 
(2000)), establishes the existence of common priors via the absence of mutually 
profitable bets. Samet’s characterisation (Samet (1998a)), in contrast, shows that the 
existence of a common prior can be interpreted more directly in terms of the players’ 
beliefs as encoded in the type space and type matrices. 
 
Samet himself provides an intuitive explanation of his result in this way: imagine that 
Adam and Eve – who have both excelled in their studies at the same school of economics 
– are asked what return they expect on IBM stock. Having been exposed to different 
sources of information, we oughtn’t be surprised if the two provide different answers. But 
we can then go on to ask Eve what she thinks Adam’s answer was. Being a good 
Bayesian, she can compute the expectation of various answers and come up with Adam’s 
expected answer. Likewise, Adam can provide us with what he expects was Eve’s answer 
to that question. This process can continue, moving back and forth between Eve and 
Adam, theoretically forever. There are, in this example, two possible infinite sequences 
of alternating expectations, one that starts with Eve and one that starts with Adam. 
 
Samet calls this process ‘obtaining an iterated expectation’, and shows that there exists a 
common prior if and only if both of these sequences converge to the same limit. He 
achieves this result by representing Adam’s beliefs
4
 by a type matrix 1M  and Eve’s 
beliefs by type matrix 
2M . These then form two ‘permutation matrices’, 121 MMM =σ , 
which is intended to be used for the process of obtaining iterated expectations starting 
with Adam, and 212 MMM =σ , which does the same for the iterated expectations starting 
with Eve. It then turns out to be the case that both 
1σ
M and 
2σ
M  are ergodic Markov 
matrices, and hence by standard results in Markov chain theory, each of them has a 
unique invariant probability measure, which may be labelled respectively 
1p  and 2p . We 
can call these ‘Samet probability measures’. It is then shown in Samet (1998a) that if 
21 pp ≠ , Adam and Eve cannot share a common prior. On the other hand, if 21 pp = , then 
not only is there a common prior, it has positively been identified – it is precisely 
21: ppp == . 
 
This is a remarkable result, made all the more remarkable by the fact that it applies 
results developed in Markov theory for the study of stochastic processes to answer a 
question that seems not to be even remotely related. But it still leaves some remaining 
questions. For one thing, as Nehring (2001) points out, the condition is ‘epistemically 
somewhat opaque. In particular, by looking at the limit, it is no longer transparent who 
does the expecting, and even what the direct object of expectation is; only some “ultimate 
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object of expectation” is given’. Infinite objects of contemplation are certainly not 
unknown in game theory, which pioneered the study of such infinitary statements as ‘she 
knows that I know that she knows that I know that …’. Never the less, a finitary 
characterisation of the same concept can be expected to add insight. Secondly, one might 
also ask if this characterisation can be expressed in a way that is intrinsic to the subject to 
hand, without directly referring to Markov chain concepts. Finally, Samet (1998a) shows 
that if the limits of the iterated expectations do not converge to one and the same limiting 
vector, there is no common prior, but is silent about what those limits do tell us in the 
absence of a common prior.  
 
Proposition 1 of this paper answers this last question by showing that, in the 2-player 
case, whether or not the iterated expectations limits converge to the same vector, the 
Samet probability measures are, under all conditions, priors. In fact, maintaining the 
notation of 
1p  and 2p as above, 1p  is a prior for player 1, and 2p  is a prior for player 2.  
 
Furthermore, letting p′  be a prior for player 1 and p ′′  be a prior for player 2 (so that 
pMp ′=′ 1  and pMp ′′=′′ 2 ) we define the pair ),( pp ′′′  as being balanced if they satisfy 
the equations pMp ′′=′ 2  and pMp ′=′′ 1  – in a sense, Adam’s prior from this pair is 
‘fundamentally paired’ to Eve’s prior when Adam plugs in Eve’s prior into his equation 
defining a prior, and vice versa. This simply-stated definition gives us the finitary 
characterisation sought in the previous paragraph: the proof of Proposition 1 shows that 
the Samet probability measures are always a balanced pair of priors and Proposition 2 
shows that in each single-meet two-player type space, a balanced pair of probability 
measures is also a pair of Samet measures. The conclusion is that a unique balanced pair 
is guaranteed always to exist. A common prior can then be characterised as a self-
balancing pair, meaning a balanced pair ),( 21 pp  such that 21 pp = .   
 
The balanced pair ),( 21 pp , however, contains more information than just the answer to 
the question ‘does a common prior exist?’. When the priors are disparate, the vector 
21 pp −  serves as a measure of ‘how far’ the type space is from having a common prior, 
and under conditions of common knowledge it encodes implications regarding bounds on 
the range of possible expected values. This is expressed formally in propositions 3, 4 and 
5, along with the definition that players 1 and 2 having ε -separated priors with respect 
to a random variable f if their balanced pair ),( 21 pp  satisfies ε=− fpp )( 21 .  
 
In particular, writing player i’s expectation of f as fEi , proposition 3 shows that under 
the condition of ε -separated priors, if it is common knowledge at a particular state that 
11 α=fE  and 22 α=fE , then εαα =− 21  – which is a generalisation of Aumann’s 
agreeing-to-disagree theorem, as that theorem is recapitulated in the limit as )( 21 pp −  
approaches zero. Proposition 4 goes further, showing that if the players have ε -separated 
priors with respect to f and it is common knowledge at a particular state that fEfE 21 ≥ , 
then it cannot also be the case that it is common knowledge that ε>− fEfE 21 . This is a 
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generalisation of the main ‘no-bet’ result of Sebenius and Geanakoplos (1983) as again 
that theorem is recaptured in the limit as )( 21 pp −  approaches zero.   
 
In fact, the conclusions of these celebrated theorems can hold true under certain 
conditions even when 0)( 21 >− pp . What counts is the vector-space geometric 
relationship of a random variable f with respect to the vector difference 
21 pp −   –  if f is 
perpendicular to 
21 pp − , then 0)( 21 =− fpp , and the players cannot agree to disagree 
under common knowledge. What happens when there is a common prior is that each and 
every vector f is perpendicular to 021 =− pp . Otherwise, the non-zero projection of f on 
21 pp − is crucial. From this perspective, the literature on ‘agreeing-to-disagree’ type 
results stemming from the CPA can be considered the study of the special limit case of 
type spaces in which 021 =− pp . 
 
This leads naturally to the question: how ubiquitous is the case of common priors within 
the general set of type spaces of two players? This is explored in Proposition 6. 
Somewhat surprisingly at first glance, the answer depends on the cardinalities of the 
information partitions the players. A type space is defined to be complementarily-
partitioned if the sum of the cardinalities of the partitions of player 1 and of player 2 
equals one plus the cardinality of the state space. Within the space of type spaces that are 
not complementarily-partitioned, the set of type spaces with common priors is nowhere 
dense, indicating that common priors should be extremely rare. However, amongst the 
complementarily-partitioned type spaces, this no longer holds, as examples show, and 
common priors can be much more common.  
 
The geometric relationship between random variables and the vector 
21 pp − also has 
implications regarding how ubiquitous 'mutually profitable bets' are between players. As 
shown in Proposition 7 and the discussion following it, it turns out that under disparate 
priors, there is a large cardinality of such bets, which might indicate that the various 'no 
trade/no betting' theorems that exist fail – spectacularly – to describe reality as we see it, 
simply because they assume a common prior, when in fact common priors are rare. 
 
So far in this summary we have dealt solely with the two-player case. Many of the results 
extend to the n-player case, as shown in section 4. The results on balanced priors extend 
in a particularly elegant way: Samet (1998a) shows that for each permutation of the n 
players, one can associate an invariant measure, and then derives a simple test: a common 
prior exists if and only if all the !n  measures coincide, in which case the common prior 
has been identified. In Propositions 8 and 9 in this paper, we show that the full set of !n  
vectors is not necessary, as it breaks down naturally into 1−n  n-tuples of priors, where 
each such n-tuple satisfies the conditions that it is an orbit of a certain group of 
permutations and each element of the n-tuple is a prior of a unique player. It then turns 
out to be the case that a common prior exists if and only if the elements of any single 
such n-tuple completely coincide, in which case the common prior has been identified.  
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This last point ties into a subject that has received little attention in the literature: the 
efficient calculation of a common prior, given a type space. Samet’s results indicate that 
by using numerical methods developed for calculating the invariant measures of Markov 
matrices, it is possible to calculate explicitly a common prior when such exists, but in the 
n-player case this might require as many as !n  separate calculations, a significant 
calculation burden. The results here show that this burden can be reduced appreciably, by 
cutting the number of Markov-type invariant measure calculations to one, followed by at 
most 1−n  straightforward vector-matrix multiplications. 
 
1.3 Outline of Paper 
 
The broad outline of the paper includes preliminary definitions and results in section 2; 
the two-player case is explored in section 3, and section 4 is devoted to the n-player case. 
Proofs appear in the body of the paper, except for a couple of observations and lemma, 
whose proofs are relegated to the appendix, when it was felt that the full details of the 
proofs would do more to hinder than help the flow of ideas. 
 
 
2. Preliminary Definitions and Results 
 
Formally, a type space for a set of players },...,1{ nI =  is a tuple Iiii tI ∈∏Ω ),(,, , where 
Ω  is a finite set, whose elements are called states. iΠ  is a partition of Ω  for each Ii∈ . 
Subsets of Ω  are events. For each Ω∈ω , )(ωiΠ  is the element of the partition iΠ  
which contains ω . For each i, it  is a function 
Ω∆→Ω:it , which associates with each 
state ω  the type of i at ω , a probability distribution over Ω . The type function it  for 
each i must satisfy two conditions: for each Ω∈ω , 1))()(( =Π ωω iit ; and for each 
)(ωω iΠ∈′ ,  )()( ωω ii tt =′ .   
 
It will be assumed here, without further comment, that for each i and ω , 0}))({( >ωωit  – 
mainly because then the results of Samet (1998a) can be freely adduced. An enquiry 
along similar lines to that conducted here without this assumption is possible in principle, 
but doing so would require replacing the notion of common knowledge with that of 
common 1-belief (as defined in Moderer and Samet (1989)) and the notion of the meet by 
events E which are minimal non-empty events for which E is the common 1-belief in E. 
 
Given a state space Ω  and a set of players I, ),( IT Ω  will stand for the set of all possible 
type spaces Iiii tI ∈∏Ω ),(,, . When the cardinality of I is fixed and understood, )(ΩT  
can stand for ),( IT Ω .   
 
In the sequel a fixed type-space ),(),(,, ITtI Iiii Ω∈∏Ω ∈  will often be assumed as 
given. When varying considerations, such as whether I contains two players or n players, 
are relevant, they will be explicitly stated . 
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The meet of Iii ∈Π )( is the partition Π  of Ωwhich is the finest among all partitions that 
are coarser than iΠ  for each i.  
 
Given a state Ω∈ω , an event A is common knowledge at ω if and only if A contains the 
member of the meet Π  that contains ω . Equivalently, A is common knowledge if A is 
the union of all the elements of Π  contained in A.   
 
The vector space ΩR  will play a prominent role in this research. Given a vector Ω∈Rv  
and a real number α , ),( αvH  will denote the hyperplane defined by α=vx , and 
similarly ),( αvH +  denotes the open half-space defined by α>vx  and ),( αvH −  the open 
half-space defined by α<vx .  
 
Following standard conventions (see for example Gale (1960, page 43)), depending on 
the context, 0 will sometimes be understood to mean the origin in ΩR , i.e. the vector 
)0,...,0,0,0( . Given a vector )( jv ξ= , 0  >v  means 0≥jξ for all j. 0>v  means 0>jξ for 
all j, and 0≥v  means 0≥jξ  for all j but 0≠v . If 
Ω∈Rwv, , wv   > , wv >  and wv ≥  
respectively stand for 0  >−wv , 0>−wv  and 0≥−wv . 
 
Probability measures on Ω  will be considered row vectors in ΩR . Random variables (i.e. 
real-valued functions on Ω ) and the column vectors in ΩR  corresponding to them will 
frequently be used interchangeably here. For a probability measure p and random 
variable f, the expectation of f with respect to p is the vector dot product 
∑= ω ωω )()( fppf . The special random variable A1  for an event A is the characteristic 
function getting the value 1 if A∈ω  and 0, and given a probability measure p, the 
probability of event A under the measure p is the expectation of A1 with respect to p, i.e. 
)()()(1)(1 Apppp
AAA
=== ∑∑ ∈ωω ωωω . 
 
For a given type space define for each player i the type matrix iM  in 
2ΩR , by 
}))({(),( ωωωω ′=′ ii tM , which is a Markov matrix representing it  as if were a 
Markovian transition function.  
 
For each random variable f on Ω , the expectation of player i of that random variable, 
when viewed as a function of the state, is again a random variable fEi  given by 
∑ Ω∈′ ′′= ω ωωωω }))({()()( ii tffE , which can more simply be written as a vector dot-
product for each Ω∈ω : ftfE ii ⋅= )()( ωω . Given the definition of iM , fEfM ii = , 
and in this paper the notation fM i  and fEi will therefore often be used interchangeably 
to mean the same thing.  
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The conditional expectation of a random variable f, conditional on an event A, is also 
definable as just another random variable in this context, as follows:   
 





=
≠′′′
=
∑
Ω∈′
0))((                                                              0
0))((        }))({()()(1
))((
1
))(|(
At
Attf
AtAfE
i
iiA
ii
ω
ωωωωω
ωω ω  
 
If it is the case that for a given event Y , random variable f and real-number α , 
αω =)(fEi  uniformly for all Y∈ω , then α=)|( YfEi can be written unambiguously, 
without the necessity of specifying the particular states. From the definitions, it follows 
that for each iY Π∈  )|( YfEi is uniform over all states.  
 
Observation. Given any 1≥k  and type matrix iM , i
k
i MM = . 
 
The proof of the observation appears in the appendix. 
 
Corollary. For any 1≥k , random variable f, and Ii∈ , fEfE i
k
i = .  
 
Given an event A and regarding A1  as a column vector, AiM 1 is another column vector 
which can be regarded as the random variable such that 
 
∑
∈′
=′=
A
iiAi AttM
ω
ωωωω ))((}))({()(1  
 
Given a type space, one can ask whether the space might have come to exist, in its 
current state, from a space with no information at all, by the players acquiring new 
information over time and updating their beliefs in a Bayesian manner. Each player’s 
possible initial belief on the no-information primeval space is called a prior. In general, 
given player i’s current type, there will not be a single prior from which the player could 
have arrived at the current state from the (hypothetical) primeval past – there will be a set 
of possible priors. A main question is then whether or not the agents have a common 
prior, meaning a possible initial identical belief that implies the differences in probability 
assessments currently seen amongst the players can be attributed solely to asymmetric 
information received over time.  
 
More formally, a prior for Ii∈  at state ω  is a probability measure Ω∆∈p  such that for 
each event A ))(())(|( AtAp ii ωω =Π , whenever the conditional probability measure is 
defined. A probability measure is a prior for i, without the local specification, if it is a 
prior for i at each and every state ω  . 
 
Given a particular player i, each type of that player, )(ωit , is a prior at ω . In fact, the set 
of all priors for player i can be identified with the convex hull of all of i’s types (cf. 
Samet (1998b)). 
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The vector dot-product equation ))(()()1( AtpMp iAi ωωω∑ Ω∈=  establishes that a 
probability measure p on Ω  is a prior for i iff it is an invariant probability measure for 
iM , i.e. ppM i = . A common prior, therefore, is a single p such that simultaneously for 
all players i, ppM i = . 
 
For a fixed Π∈Q  and for each i, the restriction of the type-matrix iM to Q, denoted by 
Q
iM , is defined by 
 



∉
∈′
=′
Q
Qt
M
iQ
i ω
ωωω
ωω
                    0
    }))({(
),(  
 
 
For any random variable random variable f on Ω , fEQi  is defined as fM
Q
i
regarded as a 
random variable.  
 
Given the n type matrices defined by a type space, for any permutation σ of I write  
 
)()1( nMMM σσσ L=  
 
and for any random variable f, 
 
fEEfE n)()1( σσσ L=  
 
The iterated expectation of f with respect to σ  is the sequence ∞=1))(( k
k fEσ . 
 
The definition of QMσ  is the obvious one 
 
Q
n
QQ MMM )()1( σσσ L=  
 
 
Samet (1998a) includes the following result, which will be crucial for the sequel:  
 
Theorem (Samet). For each Π∈Q  and Ii∈ , Q
i
Mσ  is ergodic and therefore has a unique 
invariant probability measure Q
i
pσ . The ergodicity  of this matrix then further implies that 
the iterated expectation of any random variable f with respect to 
iσ , given by 
fM kQk i )(lim σ∞→ , converges at every state to fp
Q
iσ
 within each Q – in words, the iterated 
expectations are common knowledge and uniform in each state. On each Π∈Q , the 
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players have a common prior if and only if for all Iji ∈, , QQ
ji
pp σσ = – hence there exists 
at most one common prior on Q.  
 
The following theorem, which appears as Lemma 3 in Nehring (2001), will also be 
needed: 
 
Theorem (Nehring).  Define ][ f , for any random variable f, to be the smallest linear 
subspace L of ΩR  containing f with the property that LgEi ∈ whenever Lg∈ , for any 
player i and random variable g. Then given any finite sequence ),...,,( 21 Kiii  of elements 
in I, with 2≥K , and any random variable f, there exist random variables Iiig ∈}{ in ][ f  
such that 
 
)()(... 121 iii
Ii
iiii gEgEfEfEEE KKK −=− ∑
∈
−
 
 
 
3. Two Players 
 
3.1 Identifying the Priors 
 
Throughout this section, the fixed type space Iiii tI ∈∏Ω ),(,,  will be assumed to satisfy 
the constraint that the cardinality of I is equal to 2, and the players will be labelled player 
1 and player 2. Because this labelling is arbitrary, some of the results will be worded as 
applying to player 1 with respect to player 2 in certain symmetrical situations, with the 
understanding that the symmetry immediately implies that they apply just as well to 
player 2 with respect to player 1. 
 
When there are two players, there are only two possible permutations of the set of players 
– which will be labelled here )1,2(1 =σ  and =2σ  identity – and hence two permutation 
matrices 121 MMM =σ and 212 MMM =σ . For each Π∈Q , 
QM
1σ
and QM
2σ
 each have a 
unique invariant probability measure, respectively Qp
1σ
 and Qp
2σ
. We will call Qp
1σ
 and 
Qp
2σ
the Samet probability measures of the type space with respect to Q. 
 
It will be assumed, temporarily, that }{Ω=Π , so that there is no need to specify Π∈Q , 
and we can write  
i
pσ  in place of 
Q
i
pσ , etc., easing the notational burden in formulae and 
proofs. The more general case of multiple elements of the meet will be returned to later.  
 
Note that in what follows there is no assumption that 
21 σσ
pp = – in other words, we are 
explicitly permitting the possibility of disparate priors. 
 
Proposition 1. 
1σ
p  is a prior for player 1, and 
2σ
p  is a prior for player 2.  
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Proof. By definition of invariant probability measure, 
1111 12 σσσσ
pMMpMp == . 
Multiplying on the right by 2M , this leads to 2212 11 MpMMMp σσ = . Rewriting this as 
2212 11
))(( MpMMMp σσ =  makes clear that 21Mpσ  is an invariant probability measure of 
221 σ
MMM = . But as 
2σ
M is ergodic, it has a unique such invariant probability measure, 
which we already labelled as 
2σ
p , leading to the conclusion that 
21 2 σσ
pMp = . 
 
We can now run the following series of calculations. First multiply on the right by 
2M : 
 
222 21
MpMMp σσ =  
 
But from an earlier observation, 2
2
2 MM = , so 
 
22 21
MpMp σσ =  
 
We started this chain of calculations with 
21 2 σσ
pMp = , so we conclude that 
 
222
Mpp σσ =  
 
In other words, the unique Samet probability measure of 
2σ
M , 
2σ
p , is also an invariant 
measure of 2M , hence a prior for player 2. By entirely symmetric considerations, we can 
just as readily conclude that the unique Samet probability measure of 
1σ
M , 
1σ
p , is an 
invariant measure of 1M , i.e. 111 Mpp σσ = , hence a prior for player 1.   
 
Note: The previous result can also be understood within the context of the derivation of  
fp
iσ
 through the infinite process fM kk i )(lim σ∞→ , for an arbitrary random variable f, as 
follows. Set fMg 2= . Consider the column vector which is uniformly gp 2σ . This is 
equal to gM kk )(lim 2σ∞→ . But the sequence 
 
,...,
222
gMMgMs σσσ=  
 
can be re-written as 
 
,...)(,)( 22121221 fMMMMMfMMMs =  
 
and again as 
 
,...)(,)( 22121221 fMMMMMfMMMs =  
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or 
 
,..., 212121 fMMMMfMMs =  
 
so that fMgMs kk
k
kk )(lim)(limlim 22 σσ ∞→∞→∞→ == . But this in turn means that 
fpgp
22 σσ
= , or fpfMp
22 2 σσ
= . As f was selected arbitrarily, it may be concluded that 
22 2 σσ
pMp = . A symmetric argument yields 
11 1 σσ
pMp = . 
 
Notation. We will henceforth label the Samet probability measures of the permutation 
matrices, 
1σ
p and 
2σ
p , more simply as 1p  and 2p , for ease of notation. As just shown, 
1p  and 2p  are guaranteed to be priors, every type space has a unique pair of such priors, 
and they satisfy the equations 
111 pMp = , 222 pMp = , 221 pMp =  and 112 pMp = . 
 
3.2 Balanced Pairing 
 
The previous proposition showed that the Samet probability measures of the permutation 
matrices satisfy certain equations involving the type matrices. These equations, it turns 
out, characterise these measures, so that we can use them for a definition more intrinsic to 
the study of type-spaces that avoids the appeal to concepts from Markov chain theory 
(even though we will still lean on results from that theory for existence and uniqueness) . 
 
Definition. Given a pair of type matrices 
1M  and 2M , a pair of probability measures 
),( 21 pp  are a balanced pair if they satisfy the equations 221 pMp =  and 112 pMp = .  
 
Proposition 2. For each single-meet two-player type space, there exists a unique 
balanced pair of probability measures ),( 21 pp , and this pair is a pair of priors, so that in 
addition 111 pMp =  and 222 pMp = . The existence of a common prior is equivalent to the 
existence of a self-balanced prior, meaning a balanced pair ),( 21 pp  such that 21 pp = . 
 
Proof.  Suppose that a balanced pair ),( 21 pp  exists. Then 221212 pMpMMp == . Hence 
2p  is an invariant probability measure of the ergodic Markov matrix 2σM , and therefore 
unique and equal to one of the Samet probability measures.  
 
The respective conclusion for 1p  is arrived at by entirely symmetric argumentation. Such 
a balanced pairing must always exist, by a previous proposition, because the Markov 
matrices 
1σ
M and 
2σ
M are guaranteed to have invariant probability measures. 
 
If there is a common prior p, then by definition simultaneously ppM =2  and ppM =1 , 
and we have trivially identified the unique balanced pair, ),( pp , hence p is self-
balanced. On the other hand, if the two elements of the balanced pair coincide, a common 
prior has been identified, simply because the elements of the pair are priors.  
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One perspective on balanced pairs is the following: start with the set of priors of player 1, 
i.e. the set { }11111 | qMqqP == , and the corresponding set of priors of player 2, 
{ }22222 | qMqqP == . Define a mapping 21: PP →ξ  by 211)( Mqq =ξ   –  to see that this is 
well-defined on the range, simply note that 21221 )( MqMMq =  because 2M  is 
idempotent. Similarly define 12: PP →η  by 122 )( Mqq =η .  
 
So every prior 1q  of player 1 has a ‘ξ -mate’ )( 1qξ , and every prior 2q  of player 2 has an 
‘η -mate’ )( 2qη . The question is: when is a prior the η -mate of its own ξ -mate? To 
answer this, define 
11: PP →ηξ  and 22: PP →ξη . The last proposition implies that the 
mapping ηξ  has a unique fixed point 1p , so that )( 12 pp ξ=  satisfies 112 pMp = . This 
also identifies 2p  as the unique fixed point of ξη , and the balanced pair is then ),( 21 pp . 
 
As 
1M  and 2M are varied, the corresponding balanced pair ),( 21 pp  varies as well. The 
vector 
21 pp − , as a function of 1M  and 2M , can serve as a rough measure of ‘how far’ 
the type space is from having a common prior, given that a common prior exists if and 
only if 021 =− pp . Under conditions of common knowledge, the identity of the vector 
21 pp − has implications regarding bounds on the range of possible expected values, as 
discussed after considerations of a couple of examples.  
 
3.3 Examples 
 
Example. In this example, },,,{ 4321 ωωωω=Ω , }2,1{=I , }}{},,,{{ 43211 ωωωω=Π , 
}},}{,{{ 43212 ωωωω=Π , }},,,{{ 4321 ωωωω=Π .  
 
The type matrices are 
 
















=
1     0      0      0 
0   
3
1   
3
1   
3
1
0   
3
1   
3
1   
3
1
0   
3
1   
3
1   
3
1
1M  
 
 


















=
2
1    
2
1    0       0 
2
1    
2
1    0       0 
0       0    
2
1    
2
1
0       0    
2
1    
2
1
2M  
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The permutation matrices are 
 


















==
2
1   
6
1   
6
1   
6
1 
2
1    
6
1   
6
1   
6
1
0     
3
1   
3
1   
3
1
0     
3
1   
3
1   
3
1
121
MMMσ  
 


















==
2
1    
2
1     0      0 
6
1    
6
1   
3
1   
3
1
6
1    
6
1   
3
1   
3
1
6
1    
6
1   
3
1   
3
1
212
MMMσ  
 
 
The balanced priors are the self-balanced [ ]25.0  , 25.0   ,25.0   ,25.0: 21 === ppp , hence 
this vector is also the unique common prior in this example. A quick calculation indicates 
that indeed ppM =1  and ppM =2 . 
 
Example. In this example, },,,{ 4321 ωωωω=Ω , }2,1{=I , }},}{,{{ 43211 ωωωω=Π , 
}},}{,{{ 42312 ωωωω=Π , }},,,{{ 4321 ωωωω=Π . 
 
The type matrices are 
 


















=
4
1     
4
3     0       0 
4
1     
4
3     0       0 
0        0     
2
1    
2
1
0        0     
2
1    
2
1
1M  
 


















=
3
1    0     
3
2      0 
0     
3
2     0     
3
1
   
3
1    0     
3
2      0 
0     
3
2     0     
3
1
2M  
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The permutation matrices are 
 


















==
12
1   
4
1   
3
1   
3
1 
6
1    
2
1   
6
1   
6
1
12
1   
4
1   
3
1   
3
1
6
1    
2
1   
6
1   
6
1
121
MMMσ  
 


















==
12
1    
2
1   
6
1   
4
1 
12
1    
2
1   
6
1   
4
1
6
1    
3
1   
3
1   
6
1
6
1    
3
1   
3
1   
6
1
121
MMMσ  
 
The balanced priors are  
 



=
990
135
 ,   
495
243
  ,  
4950
1125
  ,  
4950
1125
1p  
 



=
33
4
  ,  
33
14
  ,  
33
8
  ,  
33
7
 2p  
 
Again, straight-forward vector calculations show that the equations 
111 pMp = , 
222 pMp = , 221 pMp =  and 112 pMp =  are satisfied, as expected. 
 
3.4 Common Knowledge and Disparate Priors 
 
We can now relax the assumption that }{Ω=Π , and consider the general case in which 
the meet contains several elements. There are now (at most) two balanced priors on each 
element Q of the meet, Qp1  and 
Qp2 . We can also trivially assign balanced priors to each 
state, in the sense that given a state Ω∈ω  the associated balanced priors can be defined 
by )(: ωω Qii pp = , where )(ωQ  is the element of the meet containing ω . 
 
Proposition 3. In a 2-player type space, given a random variable f and a state *ω , if 
εωω =− fpp ji )(
**
, then if it is common knowledge at *ω  that player 1’s expectation of f 
is 1α  and player 2’s expectation of f is 2α , then εαα =− 21 . 
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Proof. As defined above, ftfE ii )()( ωω = . Under the assumption of mutual common 
knowledge, the valuations 
11 )( αω =fE  and 22 )( αω =fE  hold uniformly for all 
)( *ωω Π∈ .   
 
Consider the expression )(
*
fEfEp jii −
ω
. As it was assumed that 11 )( αω =fE  and 
22 )( αω =fE  uniformly, the vector fEfE ji −  is uniformly 21 αα − . By definition, 
every prior is a probability measure, and hence ∑ =ω
ω ω 1)(
*
ip , so that )(
*
fEfEp jii −
ω  
2121 )(
*
ααωαα
ω
ω −=−= ∑ ip .  
 
But )(
*
fEfEp jii −
ω  is equal to fMpfMp jiii
** ωω − , which by above results is given 
by fppfpfp jiji )(
**** ωωωω −=− .     
 
This result can be understood from elementary considerations of the balanced priors as 
Samet invariant probability measures on the permutation matrices, as calculated in the 
infinite limit of iterated expectations. If it is common knowledge that player 1’s 
expectation of f is 
1α , then the infinite sequence ,...,, 121121 fMMMfMMfM  is 
constantly uniformly 1α , hence trivially is uniformly 1α  in the limit. A similar statement 
holds if player 2’s expectation of f is 2α , with respect to the sequence 
,...,, 212212 fMMMfMMfM . It is therefore not surprising that under full common 
knowledge, fpp )(
**
21
ωω −  turns out to be the same as 21 αα − . 
 
Note that this implies that the possible spread of expected values under common 
knowledge depends on the vector geometry of the random variable f with respect to the 
vector 
**
21
ωω pp − . If f is perpendicular to 
**
21
ωω pp − , then 0)(
**
21 =− fpp
ωω , and the 
players cannot agree to disagree under common knowledge – which is exactly what 
happens when there is a common prior, because then 0
**
21 =−
ωω pp  and each and every 
vector is perpendicular to 0. In other cases, the non-zero projection of f on 
**
21
ωω pp − is 
crucial. (Note that the vector 
**
21
ωω pp −  itself has constraints on its possible values: 
0)()(
**
21 =−∑ Ω∈ω
ωω ωω pp , because ∑ Ω∈ =ω
ω ω 1)(
*
1p  and ∑ Ω∈ =ω
ω ω 1)(
*
2p .) 
 
Proposition 3 thus naturally motivates the following definition: 
 
Definition: In a 2-player type space with balanced priors ω
1
p  and ω
2
p  at a state ω , for 
each random variable f , players 1 and 2 will be termed to have ε -separated priors with 
respect to f at ω  if εωω =− fpp
ji
)( . 
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As a corollary of the proof of the last proposition we can get a yet stronger result, attained 
by weakening the insistence that the common-knowledge expectations of the two players 
be given by precise values 
1α  and 2α , and assuming only common knowledge of the fact 
that one player has greater expectations than the other player.  
 
Proposition 4. In a 2-player type space, if the players have ε -separated priors with 
respect to random variable f at state *ω , and if it is common knowledge at *ω  that 
fEfE 21 ≥ , then it cannot also be the case that it is common knowledge that 
ε>− fEfE 21 . Similarly, it cannot be the case that it is common knowledge that 
ε<− fEfE 21 . Thus, either εωω =− )()( 21 fEfE  for all )(
∗Π∈ ωω , or there is at least 
one )(1
∗Π∈ ωω  with εωω >− )()( 1211 fEfE  and at least one )(2
∗Π∈ ωω  such that 
εωω <− )()( 2221 fEfE . 
 
Proof. If at *ω  it is common knowledge that fEfE 21 ≥  and ε>− fEfE 21 , then  
εωωω
ω
ωω >−=− ∑ )]()()[()( 211211
**
fEfEpfEfEp , because the latter expression is a 
weighted average of elements, each of which is strictly greater than ε . But as in the 
above proof, )( 211
*
fEfEp −ω  – which must be greater than or equal to zero by the 
assumption of common knowledge that fEfE 21 ≥  – is by previous results equal to 
fMpfMp 2111
** ωω − , which is εωωωω =−=− fppfpfp )(
****
2121
, the last equality 
following from the assumption of ε -separated priors with respect to f. This is a 
contradiction. 
 
Similarly, if it is common knowledge that fEfE 21 ≥ and ε<− fEfE 21 , we derive a 
contradiction to the assumption that εωω =− fpp )(
**
21 .    
 
It can readily be seen that this proposition implies the previous one – if it is common 
knowledge that player 1’s expectation of f is uniformly 1α  and player 2’s expectation of f 
is uniformly 2α , where 21 αα >  without loss of generality, then the assumption of  ε -
separation with respect to f implies that 
21 αα −  can be neither less than or greater than ε  
– hence it is precisely ε . 
 
In the special case that f is perpendicular to )(
**
21
ωω pp − , the proposition states that if it is 
common knowledge that fEfE 21 ≥ , then it cannot also be the case that it is common 
knowledge that 021 >− fEfE , hence fEfE 21 =  and in this case there can be no 
agreement on disagreement. 
 
We can also consider a case intermediate between the two previous propositions, in 
which the expectation of only one player is by common knowledge uniformly a precise 
value, and ask what implications that has on the values of the expectation of the other 
player. 
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Proposition 5. In a 2-player type space, if the players have ε -separated priors with 
respect to random variable f at state *ω , and if αω =
∗
fEp i1  for one of the indexes i and 
some number α , then it must be the case that for ij ≠ , 
)(
| ∗Π ωfE j , as a vector, is located 
either in the hyperplane ),( 1 εα
ω +
∗
pH  or the hyperplane ),( 1 εα
ω −
∗
pH . In particular, if 
it is common knowledge at *ω  that β=fEi  for some number β , and fEfE ij ≥ , then 
),( 11 εβ
ωω +∈
∗∗
ppHfE j .   
 
Proof. Again, we work with )(
*
1 fEfEp ij −
ω . By assumption of ε -separated priors, this 
is equal to ε± . But it is also equal to fEpfEp ij
**
11
ωω − . The assumption that 
αω =
∗
fEp i1  then implies that εα
ω ±=fEp j
*
1 , which is the same as saying  )(| ∗Π ωfE j is 
located either in ),( 1 εα
ω +
∗
pH  or ),( 1 εα
ω −
∗
pH . The special case of common 
knowledge that β=fEi  implies that β
ωω ∗∗ = 11 pfEp i , and hence fEfE ij ≥  implies 
)( 1 εβ
ω +∈
∗
pHfE j .    
 
3.5 Common Priors as the Limiting Case of Disparate Priors 
 
With respect to the above propositions, the sharpest results are obtained in the special 
case in which
**
21
ωω pp = :  
 
• If 
**
21
ωω pp = and Af 1= , 01)(
**
=− Aji pp
ωω  for all A, hence by Proposition 3 under 
common knowledge the players can never agree to disagree on the probability of 
the occurrence of an event, and we recapitulate the theorem of Aumann (1976).  
 
• If 
**
21
ωω pp = and it is common knowledge at *ω  that α≥fE1  and α≤fE2 , then 
since 0)(
**
=− fpp ji
ωω , Proposition 4 implies that 021 =− fEfE , hence 
α== fEfE 21 , recapitulating the main ‘no-bet’ result of Sebenius and 
Geanakoplos (1983).  
 
But the condition 
**
21
ωω pp =  is equivalent to the existence of a common prior over 
)( *ωΠ , hence the propositions may be considered generalisations of these well-known 
CPA agreeing-to-disagree results. 
 
As stated in the introduction to this paper, the CPA has often been criticised in the past, 
especially when the CPA leans on a supposed ‘dynamic story’ – the view that players 
assessing differing expectations of events do so solely because of differences in the 
private information they possess respectively, because in some hypothetical past they 
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shared a common prior, with their current beliefs posterior to a, perhaps distant, past of 
shared probabilities. Gul (1998) argues that ‘since there never was a prior stage, the prior 
distribution is meaningless’.    
 
Aumann (1998)5, in reply, essentially restates the position of Aumann (1987), which 
includes the assertion that ‘people with different information may legitimately entertain 
different probabilities, but there is no rational basis for people who have always been fed 
precisely the same information to do so’. In the zeal to highlight ‘differences in 
information’ as the sole bearer of distinction, Aumann (1998) postulates that ‘if … the 
beliefs at an “actual” prior stage are different and not commonly known, then there must 
be differential information already at that stage’, and then argues that analysis must 
proceed to a further earlier stage until all differences in information have been purged and 
a common primeval prior can be identified. He is even willing to go so far as to say ‘if 
one sets forth all relevant information in sufficient detail, then in principle, there should 
be no room for differing probabilities. When we say all relevant information, we mean 
all: the schools the players attended, their childhood experiences, even their genes (which 
indirectly reflect the experience of previous generations).’  
 
The results of this paper shed further light on matters at the heart of the Gul-Aumann 
debate. The players – or any observers for that matter – need no more information than 
knowledge of the type space itself – i.e. the tuple ),(),,(, 2211 tt ∏∏Ω  – in the present, in 
order to identify all the elements of the meet }|{ Π∈QQ  and the corresponding set of 
type matrices },|{ Π∈∈ QIiM Qi . Simple matrix multiplication then yields the 
permutation matrices QM
1σ
and QM
2σ
. 
 
Obtaining the balanced priors },|{ Π∈∈ QIipQi  is then a matter of calculating the 
invariant probability measures of the permutation matrices. Numerical methods for doing 
so, either in some cases using direct methods with exact results, or in others using 
iterative methods converging up to a ‘reasonable’ tolerance, are the subject of active 
research (see for example Stewart (1994)). (The computational burden becomes even 
lighter when one considers the fact that it necessary at each Q to calculate only one of the 
Samet probability measures – say, Qp1  – and then the other can be obtained by the 
computationally simpler method of direct matrix multiplication, given that 212 Mpp = .) 
 
In principle, therefore, there is a computationally efficient and well-defined algorithmic 
procedure for going from the type space to the full set of balanced priors. With these 
latter to hand, the analysis locally at any state Ω∈ω  can proceed in one of two ways. 
 
                                                 
5
 Aumann (1998) also includes a formalisation of an argument in favour of the CPA that runs essentially 
along the following lines: Beliefs are based on information. If all information is removed, all that is left is 
an empty shell. Since there is no reason to distinguish between empty shells, individuals must start with 
common priors. Bernheim (1986) terms such an argument for common priors ‘assuming the conclusion’. 
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i) If ωω
21 pp =  there is a common prior. One may in this case embrace the 
Harsányi doctrine and assert that ‘differences in probabilities solely express 
differences in information’. A (possibly fictional) historical account of prior 
stages, in which differences in information led to disparate information 
partition refinements and differential probability assessments based on 
Bayesian updating against the common prior, may be adduced. Even if one 
chooses not to resort to conjuring the past, the existence of a common prior 
justifies quoting any of the large number of agreeing-to-disagree type results 
under common knowledge that have been proved since the seminal work of 
Aumann (1976). 
 
ii) If ωω
21 pp ≠ , there can be no common prior. One may again suppose a 
(possibly fictional) historical account of prior stages but in this case, in a kind 
of reversal of the Harsányi doctrine, in the primeval past the players begin 
unequal, with a fundamental disagreement regarding the ‘true’ prior, one 
player believing ω
1p  and the other 
ω
2p . As asymmetric information is obtained 
over time by the players, their information partitions diverge, along with their 
respective probability assessments under Bayesian updating from their 
different priors, so that both differential information and subjective 
probability differences contribute to the divergences. Even if one chooses not 
to resort to conjuring the past, in this case the players are fully justified in 
agreeing-to-disagree. Consideration of fpp ji )(
ωω − , for any random variable, 
indicates how far apart the players can be when agreeing-to-disagree under 
common knowledge with respect to f, as proved in the above propositions. 
 
In summary, it is the set of vectors }|{ Π∈− Qpp Qj
Q
i  that contains the information for 
the above-derived bounds on expected values under conditions of common knowledge. 
Since the values of }|{ Π∈− Qpp Qj
Q
i  can be derived from the type space, it follows that 
one needs no more than knowledge of the tuple ),(),,(, 2211 tt ∏∏Ω  for these results. 
From this perspective, the entire corpus of literature on agreeing-to-disagree type results, 
such as ‘no-bet’, ‘no-trade’, etc., stemming from the CPA is the study of the special ‘limit 
case’ of a particular subset of the set of all type spaces ),(),,(, 2211 tt ∏∏Ω  – namely, the 
set of type spaces from which it can be deduced that the vectors }|{ Π∈− Qpp Qj
Q
i  are 
uniformly zero.  
 
3.6 The Rareness and Ubiquity of Common Priors  
 
The next obvious question is: how ‘special’ is a common prior situation within the space 
of all type spaces? If one were to select a random sampling of type spaces, should one 
expect common priors to be ubiquitous or rare?  
 
Fixing the state space Ω , let )(ΩT  denote the set of all type spaces of two players over 
Ω  sharing a single-element meet. (The loss of generality for the sake of simplicity is 
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tolerable as extending the proofs in this section to the case of multiple-element meets is 
straight-forward). Because I and Ω  are fixed here, an element )(Ω∈Tτ  is completely 
determined by its associated partitions, which we can label τ,1Π  and τ,2Π , along with the 
associated type functions, τ,1t and τ,2t . 
 
Next, let )()(: 11 Ω→Ω MTα  be the mapping of )(ΩT  to )(1 ΩM , the set of all type 
matrices of player 1, with )()(: 22 Ω→Ω MTα  playing the same role for player 2. Let 
)()()(: 21 Ω×Ω→Ω MMTα  stand for the bijective mapping taking each element 
)(Ω∈Tτ  to ))(),(( 21 τατα . The space )()( 21 Ω×Ω MM  can be considered a sub-space of 
22 ΩΩ ×RR , with the latter endowed with the standard topology of vector spaces over the 
reals, hence the space )()( 21 Ω×Ω MM  naturally inherits a sub-space topology. As α is a 
bijection, we can give )(ΩT  the topology that makes α  a topological isomorphism. 
 
Let  ΩΩΩΩ ×⊂∆×∆→Ω×Ω RRMM )()(: 21β  be the mapping that takes each element of 
the space )()( 21 Ω×Ω MM  to the unique corresponding pair of balanced priors. Let the 
mapping γ  be further defined by Ω∈− Rpppp 2121 ),(: aγ  for each pair of balanced 
priors ),( 21 pp . 
 
Lemma. The mapping αβγξ oo= is continuous. 
 
The proof of this lemma appears in the appendix. 
 
 
Definition. A type space τ  in )(ΩT  will be said to be complementarily-partitioned if the 
cardinalities of its associated partitions, τ,1Π  and τ,2Π , satisfy 1,1,1 +Ω=Π+Π ττ .  
 
Notation. The set of non-complementarily-partitioned type spaces within )(ΩT  will be 
labelled )(ΩT . Denote further the sub-space of )(ΩT  consisting of type spaces that 
share a common-prior between them by )(ΩC . 
 
Proposition 6. )(ΩC  is nowhere dense in )(ΩT . 
 
Proof. This is proved in two steps. 
 
1. )(ΩC  has empty interior: Let τ  be an arbitrary element in )(ΩC , with common prior 
p. Let τ,1Π=m  and τ,2Π=n . Using the earlier defined mapping α , ),()( 21 MM=τα , a 
pair of type matrices. Associated with 
1M  is 
Ω∆∈mppp 1
2
1
1
1 ,...,, , where each 
jp1  is a 
distinct row in 1M corresponding to one of the partitions in τ,1Π , and similarly associated 
with 
2M  is 
Ω∆∈nppp 2
2
2
1
2 ,...,, . We can now form the convex hulls ),...,,( 1
2
1
1
1
mpppX  and 
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),...,,( 2
2
2
1
2
npppX , of dimensions 1−m  and 1−n , respectively, such that p is the unique 
point of intersection of these two convex polytopes, which are constrained to be within 
Ω∆ , a polytope of dimension 1−Ω .  
 
The assumption that )(Ω∈Tτ , and therefore not complementarily-partitioned, means 
that Ω<−+− 11 nm . This, plus the fact that the convex hulls intersect solely at a single 
point, implies that an arbitrarily small deformation of one or the other can pull them apart 
from the point of intersection – in the terminology of differential topology, all such 
intersections are non-transversal (cf. Guillemin and Pollack (1974)).  
 
In the specific context here, this translates into the possibility of finding a type matrix 
1M ′  with associated 
mppp 1
2
1
1
1 ,...,, ′′′  such that 1M ′  is within an arbitrarily small ε -ball of 
1M , and such that the convex hull ),...,,( 1
2
1
1
1
mpppX ′′′  has no intersection with 
),...,,( 2
2
2
1
2
npppX . Then ),( 21
1 MM ′=′ −ατ  is a type-space within ε  of τ , and )(Ω∉′ Cτ . 
 
2. )(ΩC  is closed: )(ΩC  can be defined as 
)(
1 |)0( Ω
−
T
ξ , where αβγξ oo=  is 
continuous, by the above lemma. It is therefore a closed set. 
 
This suffices to show that )(ΩC  is nowhere dense in )(ΩT .    
 
The restriction to non-complementarily-partitioned type spaces is necessary for the above 
proof to work. The heart of the proof is essentially the claim that given a pair of type 
matrices 21,MM  that share a common prior, one of them can be ‘perturbed’ by an 
arbitrarily small ε  into another type matrix such that the new pair does not have a 
common prior. But it is a theorem of differential topology that transverse sub-manifolds 
of complementary dimension intersect in 0-manifolds – i.e. isolated points. The following 
examples illustrate the implications this has for the question of the ubiquity of common 
priors.  
 
Example. Let }3,2,1{=Ω , and let the type space τ be defined by }3{},2,1{,1 =Π τ  , 
}3,2{},1{,2 =Π τ , with 2/1)1(,1 =τt , 2/1)2(,1 =τt , 1)3(,1 =τt  and 1)1(,2 =τt , 3/1)2(,2 =τt , 
3/2)3(,2 =τt . The corresponding type matrices are 
 












=
1      0      0 
0    
2
1   
2
1
0    
2
1   
2
1
1M  
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













=
3
2   
3
1   0
3
2   
3
1   0
0      0     1
2M  
 
which share the common prior (1/4,1/4,1/2). 
 
But there is no perturbation of the matrices which will lead to a situation of disparate 
priors. In fact, given any arbitrary type functions 1t and 2t , such that 
 










=
1        0       0  
0    )2(  )1(
0    )2(  )1(
11
11
1 tt
tt
M  
 










=
)3(  )2(   0
)3(  )2(   0
0       0      1
32
322
tt
ttM  
 
are type matrices, 1M and 2M will have a common prior between them. Geometrically, 
this is an example of transversally intersecting one-dimensional lines in a two-
dimensional space. 
 
Example. Let }5,4,3,2,1{=Ω , and let the type space τ be defined by }5,4,3{},2,1{,1 =Π τ , 
}3,2{},5{},4{},1{,2 =Π τ , with 2/1)1(,1 =τt , 2/1)2(,1 =τt , 2/1)3(,1 =τt , 4/1)4(,1 =τt , 
4/1)5(,1 =τt  and 1)1(,2 =τt , 1)4(,2 =τt , 1)5(,2 =τt , 4/1)2(,2 =τt , 4/3)3(,2 =τt . The 
corresponding type matrices  
 
 
4
1   
4
1   
2
1    0      0
4
1   
4
1   
2
1    0      0
4
1   
4
1   
2
1    0      0 
0       0     0    
2
1   
2
1
0       0     0    
2
1   
2
1
1






















=M  
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1       0       0      0     0
0       1       0      0     0
0       0     
4
3    
4
1   0
0       0     
4
3    
4
1   0
0       0      0       0     1
2




















=M  
 
share the common prior (0.125, 0.125, 0.375, 0.1875, 0.1875). 
 
There is no perturbation of these matrices that will lead to a situation of disparate priors. 
Geometrically, this is an example of a 1-dimensional polytope transversally intersecting a 
3-dimensional polytope inside a 4-dimensional space. 
 
It is easy to conjure up examples of such complementarily-partitioned type-spaces in any 
dimension. A trivial but instructive example in n-dimensions is  
 
 
1       ...    1   1
.
.
.
1       ...    1   1
1       ...    1   1
1






















=
nnn
nnn
nnn
M  
 
 
1       ...    0   0
.
.
.
0       ...    1   0
0       ...    0   1
2




















=M  
 
Here, 1M  is associated with a single point, whilst 2M  is associated with the entire 1−n  
dimensional polytope n∆ . An intersection – meaning a common prior – is inevitable in 
such a situation.  
 
3.7 Betting and Disparate Priors  
 
As previously noted, the main characterisation of common priors in the literature is the 
Morris-Feinberg theorem that states there is no common prior in a type space if and only 
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if there is at least one random variable t with respect to which the players can agree to 
take opposite sides of a bet.  
 
More formally, the players fail to bet on t at some state ω if it is not common knowledge 
at ω  that player 1’s expectation of t is positive, 01 >tE , and player 2’s expectation of 
t− is also positive, 0)(2 >−tE . If the players do not fail to bet on t, then t is a mutually 
acceptable bet. There is no betting amongst the players at ω if they fail to bet on any 
random variable t. Sebenius and Geanakoplos (1983) established that if there is a 
common prior, the players will never bet under common knowledge. Morris (1995) and 
Feinberg (2000), independently, proved the converse – if there is no common prior, the 
players can always identify a random variable t which is mutually acceptable. 
 
Given the amount of information that the balanced priors 1p  and 2p of a type space bear 
with respect to common knowledge and common priors, it is natural, in light of the 
Morris-Feinberg theorem, to enquire whether knowledge of the balanced priors can also 
provide information about mutually acceptable bets between the players. In order to study 
this matter, we lean on Nehring’s Theorem, mentioned above, which in its two-
dimensional version reduces to the following: recalling the definition of the permutation 
matrices 121 MMM =σ and 212 MMM =σ , given 1σM , any integer j and any random 
variable f on Ω , there exist random variables 1g  and 2g  in the linear space ][ f  such that  
)()()()( 2221111112 gMgMgMgMfMfM
j −+−=−σ , and a similar statement, mutatis 
mutandis, holds for 
2σ
M . 
 
Proposition 7. In a 2-player type space, given a random variable f and a state *ω , if 
0)(
**
≠− fpp ji
ωω , there exists a mutually acceptable bet λ  such that ][ f∈λ . 
 
Proof. Suppose without loss of generality that 0)(
**
12 >− fpp
ωω  and 0)(
**
21 <− fpp
ωω . 
Consider the expression )()( 12 fMfM
j −σ . Letting the integer j grow without bound, 
)()(lim 12 fMfM
j
j −∞→ σ  is equal to a vector whose elements are uniformly equal to 
)( 12 fMfp −
∗ω . But fpfpfMfp
∗∗∗
−=− ωωω 1212 )( , and it was already assumed that this 
last expression is greater than 0 – in other words, 0)()(lim 12 >−∞→ fMfM
j
j σ , as a 
vector inequality. 
 
This in turn implies, because the state space Ω  is finite, that for some finite k, 
)()( 12 fMfM
k −σ  is uniformly greater than 0. By Nehring’s Theorem, then, there exist 
random variables 1g  and 2g  in ][ f  such that 
 
0)()()()( 2221111112 >−+−=− gMgMgMgMfMfM
k
σ  
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But for either i, 0)( =−=− iiiiiiii gMgMgMgM , hence 0)( 2221 >− gMgM . Therefore, 
by setting  )( 2221 gMg −=λ  ,  011 >λM  and 012 =λM . 
 
Next, since 0)(
**
21 <− fpp
ωω , 0))((
**
21 >−− fpp
ωω , and by reasoning similar to the above 
we can arrive at random variables 1h  and 2h  in ][ f  such that for some finite n,  
 
0)()()()( 2122121221 >−+−=− hMhMhMhMfMfM
n
σ  
 
from which it follows that, setting )( 2122 hMh −=λ , 022 >λM  and 021 =λM . 
 
Finally, setting 21 λλλ −= , λ  by construction satisfies the condition that player 1’s 
expectation of it is positive, 01 >λE  while player 2’s expectation of λ−  is also positive, 
0)(2 >−λE .   
 
This last proposition has at least two interesting implications.  
 
Firstly, imagine two individuals who insist on finding a bet they can conduct between 
themselves. They can write down their type matrices and calculate their balanced priors. 
If the balanced priors are equal, they have a common prior and by the Sebenius-
Geanakoplos theorem they can stop right there – they will not be able to find any random 
variable on which to bet. If the priors are disparate, at state *ω , all they need do is 
identify a function f such that 0)(
**
≠− fpp ji
ωω , and then follow the iterative steps 
appearing in Nehring (2001) and the procedure in the above proof to calculate 
(admittedly not necessarily in a computationally efficient manner) a mutually acceptable 
bet λ .  
 
Secondly, from this we see that in situations of lack of common priors, the Morris-
Feinberg result holds rather strongly – there are a very large cardinality of mutually 
acceptable bets. To be more precise, start with the observation that the players needn’t 
work terribly hard to find a function f such that 0)(
**
≠− fpp ji
ωω . Denote by Z the set of 
random variables g such that 0)(
**
=− gpp ji
ωω . As 0
**
≠− ωω ji pp , Z is a hyper-plane in 
ΩR  – and so is a set of dimension less than Ω  and therefore of Lebesgue measure zero 
in ΩR . In other words, chances are that by selecting a random f in ΩR , the players can 
apply the above procedure to find a mutually acceptable bet. Even if not, suppose they 
have selected an arbitrary Zg∈ . For each 10 <≤α , the vector given by 
))(1(
** ωωαα ji ppgh −−+=  satisfies 0)(
**
≠− hpp ji
ωω  – and now again the procedure can 
be followed to find a mutually acceptable bet.  
 
Given this, it might not be surprising to discover a great deal of bets being concluded 
under conditions of disparate priors. 
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4. N Players 
 
4.1  Balanced Priors 
 
In this section, the cardinality of I, the set of players in the type space Iiii tI ∈∏Ω ),(,, , 
will be any finite number n. The number of type matrices is obviously also n, labelled 
1M through nM . 
 
With n players, there are !n  different permutations. For each permutation σ , there is an 
associated permutation matrix )()2()1( ... nMMMM σσσσ = . Given Π∈Q , each 
QMσ  is 
ergodic and has a unique Samet invariant probability measure labelled Qpσ . Permutations 
will be assumed to operate on these invariant probability measures by way of 
QQ pp µσσµ = for any permutation µ .  
 
For notational simplicity, we will again assume temporarily that }{Ω=Π . 
 
Notation: Certain subsets of nΣ , the set of all permutations on n objects, will be of 
special interest. For each Ij∈ , the set of all permutations σ  such that jn =)(σ  will be 
labelled jL→Σ , and a typical element in it will be written jj LL →→ Σ∈σ . Similarly, the set 
of all permutations σ  such that j=)1(σ  will be labelled →Σ Lj , and a typical element in 
it will be written →→ Σ∈ LL jjσ . The set of invariant probability measures }{ jp L→σ  
associated with the permutation matrices }{
j
M
L→σ
 such that jj LL →→ Σ∈σ  will be 
denoted jL→Ψ , and →Ψ Lj denotes the obvious equivalent for elements of →Σ Lj . Note the 
following cardinalities: )!1( −=Σ=Σ →→ njj LL , whilst for the probability measures we 
have an upper bound on distinct cardinalities, )!1( −≥Ψ→ njL  and )!1( −≥Ψ → njL  . 
 
One particular permutation will be important enough here to be singled out: define η  to 
be the permutation defined by: 
 






−− 1    ...    1  ...   2   1   
       ...           ...   3   2   1
nin
ni
 
 
Clearly, for any →→ Σ∈ LL jjσ , jj LL →→ Σ∈ησ . 
 
Proposition 8.  For each permutation σ , σσσ pMp n =)(  and )1()1( σησσσ L→Ψ∈= pMp . 
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Proof. Select an arbitrary j and an arbitrary →Ψ∈→ LL jjpσ . By definition, jj =→ )1(Lσ  
and 
→→→
=
LLL jjj
pMp σσσ .  
 
Write out 
→Lj
Mσ  as kj MM ... , where )(nk j →= Lσ . Follow this by multiplying both sides 
of  
→→→
=
LLL jjj
pMp σσσ  on the right by jM . We are thus lead to the equation 
jjkj MpMMMp jj →→ = LL σσ ... . Rewriting this as jjkj MpMMMp jj →→ = LL σσ ))(...( , or 
equally well as jj MpMMp jjj →→→ = LLL σησσ )( , indicates that jMp j →Lσ  is the unique Samet 
invariant probability measure of 
→Lj
Mησ . But the Samet probability measure of →LjMησ  
already has a label, 
→Lj
pησ , so in particular 
 
→→
=
LL jj
pMp j ησσ  
 
Now, jj LL →→ Σ∈ησ , so that jjp LL →Ψ∈→ησ , which in other words (recalling that 
jj =→ )1(Lσ ) means 
 
jjj
Mp
LLL →
Ψ∈
→→ )1(σσ
 
 
We can now run the following series of calculations, based on 
→→
=
LL jj
pMp j ησσ . First 
multiply on the right by 
jM : 
 
jjj MpMMp jj →→ = LL ησσ  
 
But jj MM =
2
, so 
jj MpMp jj →→ = LL ησσ  
 
We started this chain of calculations with 
→→
=
LL jj
pMp j ησσ , so we conclude that 
 
jMpp jj →→ = LL ησησ  
 
In other words, the Samet invariant probability measure of 
→Lj
Mησ , →Ljpησ , is also an 
invariant measure of jM , hence a prior for player j.  
 
Since by definition jn =)(ησ , the set }{
→Lj
pση  as →Ljσ  ranges over all elements of 
→Σ Lj  , is just jL→Ψ , and hence jj pMp j LL →→ = σσ for all jjp LL →Ψ∈→σ . As j was selected 
arbitrarily, it follows that for any permutation σ , σσσ pMp n =)( , and the proof is 
complete.   
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Corollory.  Each element of the set jL→Ψ  is a prior for player j.   
 
Given the corollary, we can call, for each j, the set of jL→Ψ  the set of balanced priors for 
player j, and we might as well label it jj L→Ψ≡Ψ . There are n such sets, 1Ψ  through nΨ , 
each of which is of cardinality at most )!1( −n , for a total of !n  balanced priors. We can 
label the totality of the balanced priors, U Ii i∈ Ψ , by Ψ . 
 
As the proof shows, the type matrices IiiM ∈}{  play the following roles here: for each j, 
jM acts, by way of the action jpM , as a mapping of all of →Ψ Lj  to all of jj Ψ≡Ψ→L ; in 
addition, for each ji ≠ , it maps one element in each iΨ  to an element in jΨ ; and it maps 
each element in jΨ  to itself. 
 
The n-player version of Proposition 5 of Samet (1998a) follows readily: if there is a 
common prior p, then for any two permutations σ and σ ′ , ppMpM == ′σσ , and all the 
balanced priors are equal by definition. In the other direction, if all the balanced priors 
coincide, a common prior has been identified, simply because the balanced priors are 
priors. 
 
4.2 Orbits of Priors 
 
It would seem from the previous section that a priori one may need to calculate all the !n  
Samet probability measures in order to answer the question ‘is there a common prior’ for 
a given n-player type space. This is quite a calculational burden, given the n-fold matrix 
multiplication needed for working out each matrix σM , and then the effort required for 
working out the invariant probabilities of these Markov matrices. Fortunately, it is 
possible to prove a theorem that indicates an easier way. 
 
Definition. For any Ψ∈σp , the orbit of σp under the action of the permutation η  – i.e., 
the n-element set },...,,{ 110 −nppp , where for each }1,...,0{ −∈ ni , ση pp
i
i = – will be 
termed an orbit of balanced priors, or just an orbit of priors for short. 
 
Lemma. The set of balanced priors Ψ can be partitioned into 1−n  distinct orbits of 
priors. Each such orbit contains exactly one representative from each element of Ijj ∈Ψ }{ .  
 
Proof.  That the orbits of priors partition the space Ψ  into 1−n  distinct subsets follows 
from standard results in the theory of group actions and orbits.   
 
Next, select an arbitrary σp  and consider its orbit },...,,{ 110 −nppp . From the previous 
result that ηµµµ pMp =)1(  for any permutation µ , we can immediately conclude that for 
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each i , )(1 iii Mpp σ=+ . One the other hand, as ση
i  is the permutation associated with ip , 
we can also write 
)1()1(1 σησηση iii
Mppi Ψ∈=+ , and therefore as i  goes from 0 to 1−n , each 
ip  is located in a different set of balanced priors. But the set }1,...,0{)1( }{ −∈Ψ niiση  is nothing 
other than Ijj ∈Ψ }{ , and we conclude that each orbit of priors contains exactly one 
representative from each element of Ijj ∈Ψ }{ .   
 
Proposition 9. A type space Iiii tI ∈∏Ω ),(,,  has a common prior if and only if each 
orbit of priors },...,,{ 110 −nppp  satisfies 120 ... −=== nppp . 
 
Proof. If there is a common prior, then all the elements of Ψ  coincide, hence trivially all 
the elements of each orbit of priors coincide. 
 
In the other direction, suppose that an arbitrary orbit of priors },...,,{ 110 −= npppO  
satisfies 
120 ... −=== nppp . By the lemma, each Opi ∈  is located within a distinct 
element of the set Ijj ∈Ψ }{ . But each such jΨ  is a set of priors for player j. We have 
therefore identified a common prior for the type space.   
 
This proposition considerably reduces the informational and calculational burden for 
establishing the existence of a common prior for a given type space. For one thing, the set 
of all balanced priors Ψ  contains !n  elements; each orbit of priors consists of n elements. 
Secondly, the algorithm for identifying a common prior is now reduced to selecting an 
arbitrary permutation σ , forming the permutation matrix σM , calculating its invariant 
Samet probability measure σp , and then iteratively forming the orbit of priors 
},...,,{ 110 −nppp  by setting σpp =0 and )(1 iii Mpp σ=+ . If for some i, ii pp ≠+1 , it can be 
concluded that the type space does not have a common prior. If on the other hand 
120 ... −=== nppp , not only have we established that there is a common prior p, we have 
precisely identified it. It follows that the study of type spaces with common priors is the 
study of type spaces all of whose orbits of priors are uniformly equal. 
 
Since any orbit of priors contains all the information needed to ascertain whether or not 
there is a common prior, we can select one arbitrarily to serve as the representative orbit 
of priors },...,,{ 110 −nppp  for a particular type space.  
 
Note that though the orbits of balanced priors contain information regarding the existence 
or non-existence of common priors shared between all n players in a type space, they do 
not tell us anything about common priors amongst proper subsets of the set of all players. 
There are well-know examples of type spaces that have no common priors but in which 
every pair of players share a common prior between them. 
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Finally, note that when the type space consists of only two players, there is only one 
possible orbit of priors, which is the entire 2-element space of balanced priors },{
21 σσ
pp , 
and we recapitulate the results of the previous section in the case of two players. 
 
4.3 Characterising Balanced Priors 
 
Just as in the 2-player case it is possible to provide a definition of balanced priors that is 
intrinsic to type spaces and does not make reference to Markov chain concepts.  
 
Definition. Given an n-player type space, the elements of an n-tuple of probability 
measures },...,,{ 110 −nppp  will be termed balanced if there exists a mapping 
In →− }1,...,0{:µ such that for 1−< nj , )(1 jjj Mpp µ=+ , and )1(10 −−= nn Mpp µ .  
 
It is clear that given an n-tuple of balanced probability measures },...,,{ 110 −nppp , for 
each j, jjnjjj pMMMMMp =−−+ )1()0()1()1()( ...... µµµµµ , hence they are all Samet probability 
measures. This insight leads to a straight-forward proof, which we omit here, that any n-
tuple of balanced probability measures is an orbit of balanced priors, and hence there are 
between one to 1−n  distinct such tuples in any n-player type space.  
 
 
4.4 Mutually Acceptable Bets 
 
In the n-player case, a set of random variables 
Iiit ∈}{  is a feasible bet if ∑ ∈ =Ii it 0)(ω  for 
all Ω∈ω . The players fail to bet on a feasible bet Iiit ∈}{  at some state ω  if it is not 
common knowledge at ω  that each player’s expectation iitE  of his own bet t is positive, 
i.e. 0>iitE . A mutually acceptable bet is a feasible bet Iiit ∈}{  which does satisfy the 
condition that 0>iitE  for all players. There is no betting amongst the players at ω if they 
fail to bet on any feasible Iiit ∈}{ . 
 
The n-player Morris-Feinberg theorem then states there is no common prior in a type 
space if and only if there is a mutually acceptable bet Iiit ∈}{ .  
 
Given Proposition 9, it is natural to enquire whether it is possible to derive the conclusion 
of the Morris-Feinberg theorem directly from consideration of orbits of priors. With the 
assistance of ideas from Nehring (2001), it turns out that this is true. 
 
Proposition 10. If the elements of any orbit of priors at a state *ω  in a type space 
Iiii tI ∈∏Ω ),(,,  fail to be uniformly equal, then there exists a mutually acceptable bet. 
 
Proof. Let },...,,{
***
110
ωωω
−nppp  be an arbitrary orbit of priors such that for some l, 
**
1
ωω
+≠ ll pp . Let 
lσ  be the permutation associated with 
*ω
lp , with )1(
lj σ= , so that 
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** ωω
σ l
pp l ≡ , and label the permutation associated with 
*
1
ω
+lp  by 
ll ησσ =+1 , so that 
**
1 1
ωω
σ +
≡+ lpp l . By previous results, )1(1
***
ll MpMpp jll σ
ω
σ
ωω ≡=+ . Next, select a random 
variable f such that 01 >−
∗
+
∗
fpfp ll
ω
σ
ω
σ
 – that such can be found is guaranteed by the fact 
that 
**
1
ωω
+≠ ll pp . 
 
Consider the expression )()( fMfM j
k
l −σ . Letting the integer k grow without bound, 
)()(lim fMfM j
k
k l −∞→ σ  is equal to a vector whose elements are uniformly equal to 
)( fMfp jl −
∗ω
σ
. But fpfpfMfp lll j
∗
+
∗∗
−=− ω
σ
ω
σ
ω
σ 1
)( , and it was already assumed that this 
last expression is greater than 0 – in other words, 0)()(lim >−∞→ fMfM j
k
k lσ
, as a 
vector inequality. 
 
This in turn implies, because the state space Ω  is finite, that for some finite k, 
0)()( >− fMfM j
k
lσ
 is uniformly greater than 0. Because the k-fold concatenation of 
))(),...,1(( nll σσ  is a finite sequence of elements of I, whose initial element is jl =)1(σ , 
by Nehring’s Theorem there exist random variables 
Iiig ∈}{
1 , in ][ f  such that 
 
0)()()( 11 >−=− ∑
∈
iii
Ii
jj
k gMgMfMfM lσ  
 
Setting, for each ji ≠ , )( 111 iiii gMg −−=λ , and )(
111
iiIi ij
gMg −=∑ ∈λ , it is clear that 
01 =∑ ∈Ii iλ , and that for ji ≠ , 0
1 =iiE λ , but 0
1 >jjE λ . 
 
Now, since 0)()( >− fMfM j
k
lσ
, it follows from the properties of type matrices that for 
each 1>t , 0)()(
)(
>− fMfMM j
k
t ll σσ
. But then again we can apply Nehring’s 
Theorem, each time for a finite sequent of elements of I whose initial element is )(tlσ , to 
obtain 
Ii
t
ig ∈}{ , in ][ f  such that, following the same recipe as above, we can define for 
each )(ti lσ≠ , )( tii
t
i
t
i gMg −−=λ , and )()(
t
iiIi
t
i
t
t
gMgl −=∑ ∈σλ . Clearly, 0=∑ ∈Ii
t
iλ , 
and for ji ≠ , 0=tiiE λ , but 0)()( >
t
tt ll
E
σσ
λ . 
 
Finally, setting ∑ ∈= It
t
ii λλ , we have 0=∑ ∈Ii iλ , and 0>iiE λ for all i.   
 
As with the analogous proposition presented in the previous section, this result indicates 
there is no lack of mutually acceptable bets in situations of disparate priors. Individuals 
who wish to engage in betting should have no problem identifying an endless number of 
feasible bets of the form Iiit ∈}{  they would all accept – even though they are aware that 
∑ ∈ =Ii it 0)(ω  in all states. As pointed out in Feinberg (2000), each such mutually 
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acceptable bet is analogous to the existence of n securities such that if the players are 
risk-neutral and have the same utility functions then at every state of the world the sum of 
what they are willing to pay for the securities is always greater than the total worth of the 
securities. 
 
Example. In this example, },,{ 321 ωωω=Ω , }3,2,1{=I , }}}{,{{ 3211 ωωω=Π , 
}}}{,{{ 2312 ωωω=Π , }},{},{{ 3213 ωωω=Π , }},,{{ 321 ωωω=Π . 
 
The type matrices are 
 












=
1       0       0 
  0     
2
1    
2
1
0     
2
1    
2
1
1M  
 












=
2
1     0     
2
1
  0       1        0
2
1     0     
2
1
2M  
 














=
  
3
2     
3
1      0
 
3
2     
3
1      0
0        0        1
3M  
 
 
There are two orbits of priors, given (to eight decimal places) by: 
 
[ 0.30769231  , 0.23076923  , 0.46153846] 
[ 0.38461538  , 0.23076923  , 0.38461538] 
[ 0.30769231  , 0.30769231  , 0.38461538] 
 
and 
 
[ 0.28571429  , 0.28571429  , 0.42857143] 
[ 0.35714286  , 0.28571429  , 0.35714286] 
[ 0.35714286  , 0.21428571  , 0.42857143] 
 
and it can be concluded from cursory inspection of either orbit that there is no common 
prior in this type space. 
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5. Appendix – Remaining Proofs 
 
Observation. Given any 1≥k  and type matrix iM , i
k
i MM = . 
  
Proof. Recall that by assumption, for each Ω∈ω , 1))()(( =Π ωω iit , and for each 
)(ωω iΠ∈′ ,  )()( ωω ii tt =′ .  
 
Label the states of Ω  as sωω ,...,1 , and select arbitrarily ml ωω , . Then 
}))({(),( mlimli tM ωωωω =  and by the definition of matrix multiplication 
 
∑
=
=
s
j
mjijlimli ttM
1
2 })])({(})][)({([),( ωωωωωω  
 
We can immediately note that for all j such that )( lij ωω Π∉ , 0}))({( =jlit ωω , so that for 
the sake of working out the sum in the above equation we may restrict attention only to 
those j such that )( lij ωω Π∈ .  We will accordingly write 
 
∑
′
=
=
s
j
mjijlimli ttM
1
2 })])({(})][)({([),( ωωωωωω  
 
with s′ indicating that the sum is only over those j such that )( lij ωω Π∈ . 
 
Suppose first that )( lim ωω Π∈ . Then by assumption, as j varies, )()( liji tt ωω =  so that 
}))({( mjit ωω  is a fixed value, equal to }))({( mlit ωω . This fixed value can be pulled out 
of the sum, leading to the equation  
 
∑
′
=
=
s
j
jlimlimli ttM
1
2 }))({(}))({(),( ωωωωωω  
 
But because by assumption 1))()(( =Π ωω iit , we can write 1}))({(
1
=∑
′
=
s
j
jlit ωω , hence 
),(}))({(),(2 mlimlimli MtM ωωωωωω == . 
 
 Next suppose that )( lim ωω Π∉  so that 0),( =mliM ωω . As j varies over those j such that 
)( lij ωω Π∈ , 0}))({( =mjit ωω . This fixed value can again be pulled out of the sum, 
leading immediately to the conclusion that ),(0),(2 mlimli MM ωωωω == . 
 
The general result, for k
iM , follows by straightforward k-fold iteration of this result.  
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Lemma (to Proposition 6). The mapping αβγξ oo= is continuous. 
 
Proof. The mapping β  maps elements of a real vector space to elements of a real vector 
space. Hence to establish its continuity we can rely on the Heine definition of continuity 
and consider an arbitrary sequence ),...,(),...,,(),,( 21
2
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
jj MMMMMM , of elements of 
)()( 21 Ω×Ω MM  , and the associated sequence ),...,(),...,,(),,( 21
2
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
jj MMMMMM βββ . 
Suppose that ),(),(lim 02
0
121 MMMM
jj
j =∞→ . 
 
For each 1≥k , define the infinite sequence ,...)(,...,)(,)(
111
21 kjkk MMM σσσ  and the 
sequence ,...)(,...,)(,)(
222
21 kjkk MMM σσσ , where 
jjj MMM 121 =σ  and 
jjj MMM 212 =σ . Then 
kkj
j MM )()(lim
0
11 σσ
=∞→  and 
kkj
j MM )()(lim
0
22 σσ
=∞→ , where 
0
1
0
2
0
1
MMM =σ  and 
0
2
0
1
0
2
MMM =σ . But for each j, 
kj
k M )(lim 1σ∞→ approaches a probability matrix jA each of 
whose rows is a probability vector jp
1σ
that is one of the balanced priors associated with 
the pair ),( 21
jj MM , and kjk M )(lim 2σ∞→  gives a matrix each of whose rows is the other 
balanced prior. Then kjkj M )(limlim 1σ∞→∞→  approaches a probability matrix each of 
whose rows is one of the balanced priors associated with the matrices ),( 02
0
1 MM , and the 
same holds for kjkj M )(limlim 2σ∞→∞→ . Hence ),(),(lim
0
2
0
121 MMMM
jj
j ββ =∞→ , and we 
have proved that β  is continuous. 
 
The mapping 
2121 ),(: pppp −aγ is clearly continuous, as is α , being by definition a 
topological isomorphism. Hence αβγξ oo= is continuous.   
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